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EXAMIE G THE BOUNDARIES OF HATE
CIME LAW: DISABilITIES AND THE
"IT OF DIFFERENCE"
RYKEN GRATET" & VALERIE JENNESS'"
INTRODUCTION
Although anyone is potentially a victim of crime, some
groups are particularly susceptible to victimization because of
their vulnerability, social marginality, or invisibility. Some
-criminals use a victim's minority group membership as a means
of gauging the victim's level of guardianship and the degree to
which society cares about what happens to the victim. They of-
ten expect-with good reason-that the criminal justice system
will share the view that such victims are unworthy of vigorous
enforcement of the law. The stereotypes and biases upon which
these views are based are, in turn, residues of historical relations
of subordination, inequality, and discrimination, which crimi-
nals capitalize upon and reinforce. Moreover, like the school-
yard bully who preys upon the small, the weak, and the outcast,
crimes against the disadvantaged are increasingly understood to
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possess a distinct moral status and evoke particular policy impli-
cations.
For students of public policy, advocacy groups, and legisla-
tors alike, questions about how law can best respond to the
criminal victimization of minorities and others who are system-
atically disadvantaged presents a pressing, yet familiar, problem.
This problem is often stated as a question: should those inter-
ested in enhancing the status and welfare of minority groups
pursue policies that provide "special" treatment for minorities;
or, alternatively, should they pursue policies that ignore the
unique social location, special qualities, and socially structured
obstacles faced by minorities and work solely towards improving
the social and legal resources available to all victims of crime,
regardless of their social characteristics or group membership?
Stated more succinctly, should all victims of crime be treated
the same or should some victims of crime, namely people who
face unique barriers when accessing the criminal justice system
and pursuing justice, be distinguished and treated differently?
Historically and in the current era, policymakers, especially
lawmakers, and advocates for minorities have had to respond to
this question. And, how they have responded and continue to
respond to this question is consequential for the making of
criminal law and the delivery of social justice in the United
States. This article addresses this concern by examining the
contours of and justifications for status provisions, especially
"disabilities," in American hate crime law.
There are costs and benefits associated with both choices to
policymaking. Policies that emphasize the "special" needs of
minorities, such as affirmative action policies and anti-
discrimination laws, can reinforce cultural distinctions between
"minorities" and "normals."' Such policies can render minori-
ties different from normals, underscore their "incapacities" and
special needs as the defining feature of their identities and, ul-
timately, place them in subordinate positions within both the
public and privates spheres of social life. Arguably, one of the
unintended consequences of social policies that single out sub-
' Drawing from Erving Goffman's classic work, the word "normal" is not meant to
imply moral judgment. Rather, it is used to reference societal norms and attendant
judgments that have consequences for how individuals are classified and responded
to by an array of social actors, including lawmakers and criminal justice officials.
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPOILED IDENTITY 2-8
(1963).
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populations for "special" protections and treatment is the rein-
forcement of the idea that people of color, women, gays and
lesbians, the poor, immigrants, those with disabilities, and non-
Christians, for example, are more vulnerable members of soci-
ety, less capable of responding to real and perceived vulnerabili-
ties, and ultimately less credible participants in an array of social
activities, especially those interfacing with the criminal justice
system.
In contrast, policies that ignore differences between types of
victims risk being insensitive to the increasingly well-
documented institutional, organizational, and interactional dis-
advantages faced by minorities, including those who find them-
selves confronting a criminal justice system with ideologies and
structures that were enacted without them in mind.2 Treating
minorities the same as other crime victims does little to chal-
lenge the biases and stereotypes with which criminal justice offi-
cials often operate. A sizeable body of evidence suggests that
ignoring social difference seldom is enough to produce equal-
ity, especially in the criminal justice system. Indeed, as many
advocates for people of color, Jews, women, gays, lesbians, and
persons with disabilities have recently pointed out, crimes
against minorities are often unrecognized or ignored by law en-
forcement.4  Failing to acknowledge the differences around
which systematic injustices revolve, the argument goes, allows
state officials to continue to do business as usual and does little
to remedy systematic inequality.
The choice between whether or not to emphasize and de-
lineate social difference in social policy, especially law, has been
astutely characterized by Harvard Law Professor Martha Minow
as the "dilemma of difference."5 As Minow details in her book
Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law,
the dilemma of difference is a philosophical, legal, and strategic
issue that has implications for an array of social issues ranging
'See generally MICHAELJ. LYNCH & E. Brrr PATrERSON, RACE AND INfALJusTIcE
passim (1991) (examining the ways race plays a role in the criminal justice system).
3 LindaJ. Krieger & PatriciaJ. Cooney, The Afiller-Wohl Contrversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L REV. 513, 513
(1983).
' Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Thleom) 12 HARV. WOMNEN'S W. 115
(1989); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to
Rape, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 842 (1980).
- MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AmERiCAN LAW 20-23 (1990).
2001]
RYKEN GRA TTET & VALEREJENNESS
from affirmative action to maternal leave policies to gay mar-
riage to discrimination in the workplace against persons with
disabilities. As Minow writes:
The stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by
focusing on it. Decisions about education, employment, benefits, and
other opportunities in society should not turn on an individual's ethnic-
ity, disability, race, gender, religion, or membership in any other group
about which some have deprecating or hostile attitudes. Yet refusing to
acknowledge these differences may make them continue to matter in a
world constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind. These
problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of
minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the
two groups differently.7
Often summarized as a tension between "same" versus "dif-
ferent" treatment policies, the dilemma of difference is rou-
tinely confronted by advocates for minority constituencies, most
notably those supporting or opposing the agendas of the con-
temporary civil rights movement to enhance the status and wel-
fare of people of color, the modern women's movement to
enhance the status and welfare of girls and women, the gay and
lesbian movement to enhance the status of nonnormative sex-
ualities, and the disabilities rights movement to enhance the
status and welfare of persons with disabilities. Regardless of the
vast differences among these groups, their constituencies, and
the issues they confront, the value of considering the dilemma
of difference is that it forces activists, policymakers, and mem-
bers of the morally concerned citizenry to 1) anticipate the
negative consequences of reforms based upon creating "special"
treatment where such treatment directly or indirectly repro-
duces stereotypes about minorities and 2) acknowledge the
drawbacks of ignoring the differences that define minorities of
all sorts. Of course, being cognizant of the dilemma of differ-
ence does not necessarily ensure that it is resolved; rather, it
only sensitizes advocates and policymakers to the costs associ-
ated with pursuing one kind of policy approach over another.
6 I- at 20-23; see Alfredo J. Artiles, The Dilemma of Difference: Enriching the Dispropor-
tionality Discourse with Theory and Context, 32J. SPECIAL EDUC. 1, 32-36 (1998); Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1985); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 325 (1984/85); Iris A. Young, Feminist
Moral, Social, and Legal Theory: Difference and Policy: Some Reflections in the Context of New
Social Movements, 535 U. CIN. L. REv. 535, 535 (1987).
7 MNOW, supra note 5, at 20.
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With the dilemma of difference in mind, this paper ad-
dresses a core question in the study of contemporary public pol-
icy in general and lawmaking in particular: when, how, and why
should minority status be emphasized in public policy, especially
criminal law? To address this broad question, we direct specific
attention to the making of hate crime law in the United States,
with a particular focus on the place and viability of "disabilities"
within this body of law. First, we describe the history of state
and federal hate crime lawmaking as a recent, innovative, and
distinct policy response to age-old human behavior: violence
motivated by bigotry and manifest as discrimination. Then, we
argue that an empirical focus on the inclusion/exclusion of
"disabilities" provisions in this body of law provides a useful, if
not ideal, window through which we can examine a legal basis
for including some status provisions (i.e., race, religion, ethnic-
ity, sexual orientation, etc.) and not others (i.e., age, gender,
marital status, class, occupation, etc.) in hate crime law. Once
our analytic focus on disabilities is indicated, we discuss the pa-
rameters of "disabilities" provisions in hate crime law as a pre-
cursor to identifying a set of social and legal criteria for
resolving the dilemma of difference relative to hate crime law."
Consistent with the original motivation for writing this paper,"
this is the first article to systematically consider the legal basis
and policy implications of treating crime victims with disabilities
as victims and survivors of hate crime. This paper uses socio-
logical data and research to consider the degree to which the
deployment of hate crime law is a viable venue through which
the status and welfare of minority groups-in particular persons
with disabilities-can be enhanced.
' Understanding the processes that result in the assignment of victim status to
some individuals and groups, but not to others, is key to understanding the formation
of criminal law. After all, once designated, victim status carries with it distinct under-
standings of the social relations that surround the individual, as well as his/her rela-
tionship to the larger social problem law is designed to address. Among other things,
the label of victim underscores the individual's status as an injured person that is
harmed by forces beyond his/her control; dramatizes the injured or harmed person's
essential innocence; renders her/him worthy of others' concern and assistance; and
often evokes calls for legal reform designed to address the attendant social problem.
James Holstein & Gale Miller, Rethinking Vrictimization: An Interadional Approach to 1Ic-
timology, 13 SYNMBOuc INTERAC'TON 103, 103 (1990).
'This work was commissioned by the National Research Council's Committee on
Law and Justice and subsequently presented at the Workshop on Crime Victims with
Developmental Disabilities at the National Academies of Science, Irvine, California.
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I. HATE CRIME LAW: AN INNOVATIVE RESPONSE TO "BIAS-
VIOLENCE"
The National Law Journal recently noted that the 1990s may
go down in history as "the decade of hate-or at least of hate
crime."' Although it remains questionable whether the United
States is actually experiencing greater levels of hate-motivated
conduct than in the past," it is beyond dispute that the ascen-
dance of the concept of "hate crime" in policy discourse has fo-
cused attention on violence motivated by bigotry and manifest
as discrimination in a new way. As we have argued elsewhere,
what is now commonly understood as "bias" or "hate" crime is
an age-old problem approached with a new conceptual lens and
sense of urgency.12 Despite a well-documented history of vio-
lence directed at minorities, during the 1980s and 1990s multi-
ple social movements began to identify and address the problem
of discriminatory violence directed at minorities: federal, state,
and local governments instituted task forces and commissions to
analyze the issue; legislative campaigns sprang up at every level
of government; new sentencing rules and categories of criminal
behavior were established in law; prosecutors and law enforce-
ment developed special training policies and specialized en-
forcement units; scholarly commentary and social science
research exploded on the topic; and the United States Supreme
Court weighed in with its analysis of the laws in three highly
controversial cases. 3 As a result of these activities, criminal
conduct that was once undistinguished from ordinary crime has
been parsed out, redefined, and condemned more harshly than
before. And "hate crime" has secured a place in the American
political and legal landscape.
These extraordinary developments attest to the growing
concern with, visibility of, and public resources directed at vio-
lence motivated by bigotry, hatred, or bias. They reflect the in-
creasing acceptance of the idea that criminal conduct is
"different" when it involves an act of discrimination. More im-
portantly, for the purposes of this article, it is clear that the law
0 David E. Rovella, Attack on Hate Crimes is Enhanced, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 29, 1994, at
Al.
1 JAMES JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY
POLITICS § 4 (1998).
12 VALERIE JENNESS & RYKEN GRATTET, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL
MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001).
13 id.
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has become the primary institution charged with defining and
curbing hate or bias-motivated violence. Legal reform has been
one of-if not tie most-dominant response to bias-motivated
violence in the United States." During a congressional debate
on hate crime, Representative Mario Biaggi said it most suc-
cinctly when he argued, "the obvious point is that we are deal-
ing with a national problem and we must look to our laws for
remedies." 5 Concurring, Representative John Conyers, Jr. ex-
plained that the enactment of hate crime legislation "will carry
to offenders, to victims, and to society at large an important
message, that the Nation is committed to battling the violent
manifestations of bigotry."1 6  These views reflect a general
agreement among state and federal legislators that "hate crimes,
which can range from threats and vandalism to arson, assault
and murder, are intended not just to harm the victim, but to
send a message of intimidation to an entire community of peo-
ple."7
With this solidified view of discriminatory violent conduct in
hand, in the 1970s and early 1980s, lawmakers throughout the
United States began to respond to what they perceived as an es-
calation of violence directed at minorities with a novel legal
strategy: the criminalization of discriminatory violence, now
commonly referred to as "hate crime." As result, by the turn of
the century, "in seemingly no time at all, a 'hate crimes juris-
prudence' had sprung up."'8
A. STATE HATE CRIME LAW
In the last two decades almost every state in the United
States has adopted at least one hate crime statute that simulta-
neously recognizes, defines, and responds to discriminatory vio-
lence. Hate crime statutes have taken many forms throughout
the United States, including statutes proscribing criminal penal-
ties for civil rights violations; specific "ethnic intimidation" and
"malicious harassment" statutes; and provisions in previously
enacted statutes for enhanced penalties if an extant crime is
4JAcoBs & POTtER, supra note 11, at 29-44;JENNEss & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 3;
FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHNG HATE: BIAS Czi:Es UNDER AMERICAN Lw- 4-7 (1999).
s 130 CONG. REC. 19844 (daily ed.July 22, 1985) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
16 134 GONG. REc. 11393 (daily ed. May 18, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
" Terry A. Maroney, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 567-68 (1998).
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committed for bias or prejudicial reasons. These laws specify
provisions for race, religion, color, ethnicity, ancestry, national
origin, sexual orientation, gender, age, disability, creed, marital
status, political affiliation, age, marital status, involvement in
civil or human rights, and armed service personnel. In addi-
tion, a few states have adopted statutes that require authorities
to collect data on hate (or bias) motivated crimes; mandate law
enforcement training; prohibit the undertaking of paramilitary
training; specify parental liability; and provide for victim com-
pensation. Finally, many states have statutes that prohibit insti-
tutional vandalism and the desecration or the defacement of
religious objects, the interference with or disturbance of relig-
ious worship, cross burning, the wearing of hoods or masks, the
formation of secret societies, and the distribution of publica-
tions and advertisements designed to harass select groups of in-
dividuals. This last group of laws reflects a previous generation
of what, in retrospect, could be termed "hate crime" law 9
Across the United States, state hate crime laws vary im-
mensely in wording. Some laws employ a language of civil
rights. For example, in 1987 California adopted an "Interfer-
ence with Exercise of Civil Rights" statute that states:
No person, whether or not acting under the color of law, shall by
force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, op-
press, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him or her by the constitution or laws of
this state or by the Constitution or the laws of the United States because
of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or
sexual orientation.20
In contrast, some states employ the language of "ethnic in-
timidation or malicious harassment." In 1983, for example,
Idaho adopted a "Malicious Harassment" law that declares:
It shall be unlawful for any person, maliciously and with the specific
intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's
"9 These laws appeared as early as the late 1800s in response to perceived escalation
of Klan activity. They are distinct from the contemporary hate crime laws insofar as
they are considerably older, do not contain a bias "intent standard, do not specify
"protected statuses, and most notably, were not introduced under the rubric of "hate
crimes legislation." Richard Berk et al., Thinking More Clearly about Hate-Motivated
Crimes, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 126-
31 (Gregory Herek & Kevin Berrill eds., 1992); Valerie Jenness & Ryken Grattet, The
Criminalization of Hate: A Comparison of Structural and Polity Influences on the Passage of
'Bias-Crime'Legislation in the U.S, 39 SoC. PERSP. 129, 129 (1996).
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (1987).
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race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin to: (a) Cause physical
injury to another person; or (b) Damage, destroy, or deface any real or
personal property of another person; or (c) Threaten, by word or act, to
do the acts prohibited if there is reasonable cause to believe that any of
the acts described in subsections (a) and (b) of this section will occur.
For purposes of this section, "deface" shall include, but not be limited to,
cross-burnings, or the placing of any word or symbol commonly associ-
ated with racial, religious, or ethnic terrorism on the property of another
person without his or her permission.2'
Finally, some statutes simply increase the penalty for com-
mitting an enumerated crime if the defendant committed a
criminal act that "evidences" or "demonstrates" prejudice or
bigotry based on the victim's real or imagined membership in a
legally recognized protected status. For example, in 1989 Mon-
tana adopted a "Sentence Enhancement" law that states:
A person who has been found guilty of any offense, except mali-
cious intimidation or harassment, that was committed because of the vic-
tim's race, creed, religion, color, national origin, or involvement in civil
rights or human rights activities or that involved damage, destruction, or
attempted destruction of a building regularly used for religious worship,
in addition to the punishment provided for commission of the offense,
may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of notless than 2 years or
more than 10 years, except as provided in 46-18-222.-
Despite variation in wording, these laws have criminalized
select forms of bias-motivated violence.
B. FEDERAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
Following the states' lead, the United States Congress has
passed three laws specifically designed to address bias-motivated
violence and it continues to consider additional legislation. In
1990, President Bush signed the Hate Crimes Statistics Act,
which requires the Attorney General to collect statistical data on
"crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, relig-
ion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropri-
ate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible
rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and
destruction, damage or vandalism of property."2 As a data col-
lection law, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act merely requires the
Attorney General to gather and make available to the public
21 IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1983).
22 MONT. CoDE ANN. § 45-5-222 (1989).
' Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-275 (1990).
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data on bias-motivated crime, which has been done every year
since 1991 (see Table 1). It does not, in any way, stipulate new
penalties for bias-motivated crimes, nor does it provide legal re-
course for victims of bias-motivated crime. The rationale for the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act was to mandate the collection of em-
pirical data necessary to develop effective policy. Those sup-
porting it argued that involving the police in identifying and
counting hate crimes could help law enforcement officials
measure trends, fashion effective responses, design prevention
strategies, and develop sensitivity to the particular needs of vic-
tims of hate crimes.
In 1994, Congress passed two more hate crime laws. The
Violence Against Women Act specifies that "all persons within
the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender." 4 The Violence Against Women
Act allocated over $1.6 billion for education, rape crisis hotlines,
training of justice personnel, victim services (especially shelters
for victims of battery), and special units of police and prosecu-
tors to deal with crimes against women. The heart of the legisla-
tion, Title III, provides a civil remedy for "gender crimes."
In essence, Title III entitles victims to compensatory and
punitive damages through the federal courts for a crime of vio-
lence if it is motivated, at least in part, by animus toward the vic-
tim's gender. This allowance implicitly acknowledges that
some, if not most, violence against women is not gender-neutral;
instead, it establishes the possibility that violence motivated by
gender animus is a proper subject for civil rights action. In so
doing, it defined the term "hate crime" as "a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part, to animus based on the victim's gender.
2 65
Although this law was recently ruled unconstitutional it was
predicated upon and promoted the inclusion of gender in the
concept of a hate crime.
Also in 1994, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act. This law identifies eight predicate crimes-
murder; nonnegligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated
assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction,
24 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).26 Idn at § 13981(d) (1).
"7 Brzonkala v. Morrison, 144 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1999).
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damage, or vandalism of property-for which judges are al-
lowed to enhance penalties of "not less than three offense levels
for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a
reasonable doubt are hate crimes.' '2 For the purposes of this
law, "hate crime" is defined as criminal conduct wherein "the
defendant intentionally selected any victim or property as the
object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or
sexual orientation of any person." 2 Although broad in form,
this law addresses only those hate crimes that take place on fed-
eral lands and properties.
Finally, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act was introduced in
the Senate and House of Representatives. If signed into law, this
legislation would
[A]mend the Federal criminal code to set penalties for persons
who, whether or not acting under the color of law, willfully cause bodily
injury to any person or, through the use of fire, firearm, or explosive de-
vice, attempt to cause such injury, because of the actual or perceived: (1)
race, color, religion, or national origin of any person; and (2) religion,
gender, sexual orientation, or disability of any person, where in connec-
tion with the offense, the defendant or the victim travels in interstate or
foreign commerce, uses a facility or instrumentality of interstate or for-
eign commerce, or engages in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, or where the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign
so
commerce.
Although not yet law, this pending legislation broadens the
reach of the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act.
The state and federal laws described above show that many
contemporary advocates share a commitment to using the law,"
law enforcement, 2 and the criminal justice systemss as vehicles
Hate Crime Sentence Enhancement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322 (1994).
S. 622., 106th Cong., 1st Sess., (2000).
SeejAcoBs & PorR, supra note 11, at 29;JENNESS & GRATIr, supra note 12, at 3;
Ryken Grattet et al., The Homogenization and Differentiation of Hate Crime Law in the
United States: Innovation and Diffusion in the Criminalization of Bigotry, 63 A.t. Soc. REv.
286, 286 (1998); Valerie Jenness, Social Movement Growth, Domain Expansion, and Fram-
ing Processes: The Gay/Lesbian Movement and Violence Against Gays and Lesbians as a Social
Problem, 47 Soc. PROBS. 701, 701 (1995).
2 JENNEs & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 127; BIAs Cmmi: A.mmcA., La,
ENFORCm Tr AND LEGAL RESPONSES passim (RobertJ. Kelly ed., 1993); Susan Martin,
A Cross-Burning is NotJust an Arson: Police Social Construction of Hate in Baltimore Country,
33 CRimINOLOGY 303 (1995).
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to enhance the status and welfare of minority constituencies
deemed differentially vulnerable to violence motivated by big-
otry. Despite variation in their wording and content, criminal
hate crime statutes are laws that criminalize, or further criminal-
ize, activities motivated by bias toward individuals or groups be-
cause of their real or imagined characteristics. Drawing from
Grattet, Jenness, and Curry, this definition consists of three
elements. First, the law provides a new state policy action, by ei-
ther creating a new criminal category, altering an existing law,
or enhancing penalties for select extant crimes when they are
committed for bias reasons. Second, hate crime laws contain an
intent standard. In other words, statutes contain wording that
refers to the subjective intention of the perpetrator rather than
relying solely on the basis of objective behavior. Finally, hate
crime laws specify a list of protected social statuses, such as race,
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, disabilities, etc.
These elements of the definition of hate crime law capture the
spirit and essence of hate crime legislation designed to punish
bias-motivated conduct.
The emergence and proliferation of hate crime law marks
an important moment in the history of crime control efforts,
the development of criminal and civil law, the allocation of civil
rights, and the symbolic status of select minorities in the United
States. As such, the emergence and proliferation of hate crime
laws invites an examination of the place and prominence of
status provisions-what Soule and Earle call "target groups"-
in hate crime law. This, in turn, sets the stage for an assessment
of the bases upon which some status provisions are included in
hate crime law, while others are not.
II. "DISABILITIES" AS AN ANALYrIC Focus
Our review of hate crime law leads to two interrelated ques-
tions about hate crime law as a policy response to discriminatory
violence and its relationship to select minority groups. First, to
" PETER FENN & TAYLOR McNEIL, THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM TO
BIAS CRIME: AN ExPLORATORY REVIEW 7-8 (1987); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crimes:
Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of 'Racially-Motivated Violence, 99 YALE L. J. 832
(1990);JENNESS & GATrET, supra note 12, at 127.
Grattet et al., supra note 31, at 289.
' Sarah Soule & Jennifer Earl, The Differential Protection of Minority Groups: The Inclu-
sion of Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability in State Hate Crime Laws, 1976-1995, 9
RES. IN POL. Soc. 3 (2001).
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what degree have lawmakers recognized some minority popula-
tions, and not others, as potential and actual victims of bias-
motivated conduct? Second, upon what basis should particular
constituencies be considered for inclusion in hate crime law?
To address these interrelated questions, we focus on the case of
"mental and physical disabilities" as a status jgrovision and "per-
sons with disabilities" as a target population. Although our fo-
cus on disabilities and persons with disabilities is primarily for
analytic purposes, there are at least three good reasons for
choosing this particular example.
First, persons with disabilities represent one of the largest
minority groups in the United States. According to a 1997 Cen-
sus Bureau report, about fifty-four million, or twenty percent, of
Americans qualify as having some level of disability and half of
those have a "severe" disability.37 Moreover, literally anyone can
become disabled at some point in their life; after all, some dis-
abilities are ascribed and some are achieved. With regard to the
latter, as the life expectancy for Americans increases, the popu-
lation as a whole continues to age. And, as the population gets
older and older, we can continue to expect more and more
people to acquire debilitating conditions in ways that accom-
pany the aging process itself.
Second, recent research suggests that the multitude of ways
that persons with disabilities are victimized is pronounced and,
according to some, increasing."' In particular, there is growing
agreement that the criminal justice system currently does not
serve the needs of people with disabilities particularly well; thus,
a variety of organizational and procedural reforms have been
envisioned and proposed by various groups concerned about
persons with disabilities and their relationship to crime, the
criminal justice system, and the pursuit ofjustice.Y The bulk of
these proposals for reform have been itemized and articulated
by the Office of Victims of Crime in a recently released bulletin
s Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social Construction of Targ Populatons: Imphca-
tionsfor Politics and Policy, 87 (2) AER. POL Sca. REv. 334 (1993).
JOHN McNTEiL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AhmEcANs Wirm Dsrnxrms, 1994-95,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 1 (1997).
's IM at 2.
9 CRIMEi Vic ITs-.H DEVELOPMNTAL DSABwILTES 10-20 (Joan Petersilia et al. eds..
2001) [hereinafter CMrE VICMfS].
" Id. at 41-44.
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on "Working with Victims of Crime with Disabilities."" Spon-
sored by the Department ofJustice, this publication suggests an
array of specific policy recommendations, including increasing
the accessibility of the criminal justice system through every-
thing from architectural changes to the introduction of com-
munication technologies;42 the creation of training measures for
sensitizing law enforcement officials to the needs of persons
with disabilities; fostering relations with disability service and
advocacy organizations within the community; improving data
collection efforts; and introducing specific protocols to assist
the participation of persons with disabilities in the criminal pro-
cess and to protect them from retaliation.43 Finally, and perhaps
most notably for the purposes of this article, a single recom-
mendation put forth, almost in passing, by the Office of Victims
of Crime indicates that hate crime law should be applied to
crimes against persons with disabilities. To be exact, "prosecu-
tors should invoke hate crime statutes, if indicated, when prose-
cuting crimes against people with disabilities. Judges should
apply equal sentencing or sentencing enhancements, when al-
lowed, for offenders who victimize people with disabilities.""'
Interestingly, from the point of view of the dilemma of differ-
ence, all of these proposals assume, in one way or another, that
persons with disabilities are differentially subject to bias-
motivated violence, have special needs, and face unique barriers
when it comes to accessing the criminal justice system and pur-
suing justice if or when they are victims of violence.
Third, despite their numbers and an increasingly well-
documented connection to violence, persons with disabilities
have been largely overlooked by social scientists and sociolegal
scholars interested in the nexus between violence, law and mi-
nority rights, as well as policymakers interested in responding to
violence in particular and systematic inequalities more gener-
ally.45 The vast majority of the sociolegal literature focusing on
41 CHERYL GUIDRY TYISKA, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, WORKING WITH VICTIMS OF CRIME
winH DisAB=nnEs passim (1998).
12 Marka G. Hayes, Individuals with Disabilities using the Internet: A Tool for Information
and Communication, 8 TECH. & DISABIsrn 153 (1998).
43-rTyS.A, supra note 41, at 4.
44 id.
" CRIME VIGnMS, supra note 39, at 22-30; Lennard J. Davis, Introduction to THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 1-5 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997); Barbara Faye Waxman,
Hatred: The Unacknowledged Dimensions in Violence Against Disabled People, 9 SEXUALT'Y &
DISABILITY 185-87 (1991).
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the intersection of law and violence, and minority status or
rights, focuses on race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and sexual
orientation as the prime categories of civil rights law. In large
part, this no doubt reflects the relative newness of "disabilities"
as a recognizable axis of discrimination. The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199016 is relatively new compared to other no-
table civil rights laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 Ac-
cordingly, and as we detail below, the term "disabilities" has had
a less developed history in legal and public lexicon; moreover,
the term "disabilities" in hate crime law is, at best, a second-class
citizen insofar as it is peripheral to the core of hate crime legis-
lation in the United States. Thus, it remains one of the most
overlooked and occasionally negotiable status provisions in hate
crime law.
Surprisingly, a critical discussion of the relationship be-
tween crimes against persons with disabilities and the parame-
ters of hate crime law has yet to be developed. In particular, it is
useful to first evaluate the place of "disabilities" in federal and
state hate crime law, and then examine the bases for including
"disabilities" alongside race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation in United States hate crime law. To do so
creates a venue through which a social and legal justification for
the formulation of hate crime law can be articulated and ad-
vanced.
In. THE PLACE AND PROMINENCE OF "DLsABILrrIXS" IN HATE
CRIME LAW
The most direct way to assess the degree to which state law-
makers have recognized persons with disabilities as a constitu-
ency particularly vulnerable to violence and worthy of legal and
social reconition as hate crime victims is to examine the "status
provisions" currently referenced in hate crime law. Accord-
ingly, in this section we do so by first focusing on the distribu-
tion of status provisions in state hate crime law and then
focusing on the place of "disabilities" in the evolution of federal
hate crime law.
" 42 U.S.C. § 121-01 (1990).
4742 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
Grattet et al., supra note 31, at 300-01.
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A. THE STATUS OF "DISABILITIES" IN STATE HATE GRIME LAW
Figure 1 compares the status provisions included in hate
crime laws in 1988 and 1998, ten and twenty years, respectively,
after the first state hate crime law was passed. In 1988, the most
common status provisions were for race, religion, color, and na-
tional origin. These provisions represented a legal response to
the most visible, reco nizable, and stereotypical kinds of dis-
criminatory behavior: bias-motivated violence directed at
blacks, immigrants, and Jews. While other categories of dis-
criminatory violence-like those organized around gender, an-
cestry, sexual orientation, creed, age, political affiliation, marital
status, and disabilities-are sometimes recognized in the early
period of lawmaking, they appear infrequently enough to cause
one to conclude that they were not part of legislators' concep-
tions of the "normal" axes along which discriminatory violence
routinely occurs.' Most notably, only five out of the nineteen





Armed Services Personnel 0.00% 2.5%
Involvement in Civil or 0.00% 2.5%
Human Rights
Marital Status 5.26% 2.5%
Age 5.26% 10.0%




Sexual Orientation 10.53% 50.0%
Gender 21.05% 40.0%
Ancestry 31.58% 47.5%




49JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVrrT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND
BLOODSHED 21-31 (1993).
'0 See Grattet et al., supra note 31, at 300.
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By 1999, however, a second tier of categories emerged and
sexual orientation, gender, and disabilities became increasingly
prominent in state hate crime law. Disability, in particular, rose
from being included in about one-quarter of the states to one-
half of the states. Currently, twenty-one states have laws cover-
ing disability, and that number continues to grow. While less
stereotypical than their predecessors (i.e., race, religion, and
national origin), sexual orientation, gender, and disability are
categories that have become increasingly recognized as axes
along which hate-motivated crime occurs.
The respective unfolding of these clusters of statuses-the
core and the second tier-reflects the history of various post-
1960s civil rights movements in the United States.2 Race, relig-
ion, color, and national origin reflect the early legal contesta-
tion of minorities' status and rights. Thus, there is a more
developed history of invoking and then deploying the law to
protect and enhance the status of blacks, Jews, and immigrants. 
3
Because the gay and lesbian movement,5 the women's move-
ment,55 and the disability movement50 reflect a "second wave" of
civil rights activism and "identity politics, " 57 sexual orientation,
gender, and disability, respectively, have only recently been rec-
ognized by policymakers responsible for the formulation of hate
crime law as legitimate axes around which hate crime occurs.
Therefore, these statuses remain less embedded in hate crime
law, resulting in gays and lesbians, women, and people with dis-
abilities remaining less visible than other minority groups (e.g.,
blacks, Jews, and immigrants) and yet more visible than other
groups (e.g., union members, the elderly, children, police offi-
cers, etc.).
11 VAL.ERIJENwESs & KENDALL BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL MOVEtE.qTS -AND
THEPOLITICS OFVIOLENCE 42 (1997).
-2 ROBERT A. GOLDBERG, GRAssRooTs RESISTANCE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE
TWENTETH CENTURY 141, 194, 223-25 (1991);JENN.SS & BROAD, supra note 51, at 30.
MINOW, supra note 5, at 9.
"See BARRYADAM, THE RISE OF A GAYAND LESBIAN MOVEiENr 75-80 (1987); URvASHI
VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALM. THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY & LESBIAN LIBERATION 1-4
(1995).
See MYRA MARx FERREE & BETH B. HESS, CONTROVERSY AND COALTON: THE NEv
FFmNST MOVErMNT 45-48 (1985).
5 JOSEPH P.SHAPIRo, No Prr. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CvIL RIcHTs
MOvmMNT passim (1993).
'GOLDBERG, supra note 52, at 220-23.
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B. THE STATUS OF "DISABILITIES" IN FEDERAL HATE CRIME LAW
Consistent with the patterns revealed in the previous sec-
don, a review of the legislative histories of federal hate crime law
reveals how the substantive character of federal hate crime law
was shaped-at first by minorities' advocates and social move-
ments and later by processes of institutionalization-such that
those with disabilities were recognized as victims of hate crime
only in the latter phases of federal lawmaking around the issue."
As Jenness documents, early advocacy work sponsored by an ar-
ray of local, regional, and state level organizations comprising
the Coalition on Hate Crimes59 focused solely on the scope and
consequences of race, religion, and ethnicity-based violence.
Growing awareness of this type of violence became grounds for
promoting federal hate crime legislation by a limited number of
advocates, none of whom represented the interests of persons
with disabilities. This advocacy successfully solidified a trio of
statuses-"race, religion, and ethnicity"-as the anchoring pro-
visions of all hate crime law. This solidification occurred with-
out protest from federal legislators over the appropriateness of
these provisions, which had already been legitimated by prior
decades of civil rights organizing and changes in law. °
The character of hate crime law was reshaped when the
domain of the law expanded to include additional provisions.
Shortly after federal hate crime law was envisioned, gay and les-
bian advocates developed and promoted proposals to further
differentiate hate crime victims by adding "sexual orientation"
" Valerie Jenness, Managing Difference and Making Legislation: Social Movements and
the Racialization, Sexualization, and Gendering of Federal Hate Crime Law in the U.S., 1985-
1998, 46 Soc. PROBS. 548, 566-67 (1999).
"9 The Coalition on Hate Crimes was comprised of civil rights, religious, ethnic,
and law enforcement groups, as well as a diverse array of professional organizations,
including: the Anti-Defamation League, the American Bar Association, thirty Attor-
neys General, the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, the American Psychological Association, the American Psy-
chiatric Association, the Center for Democratic Renewal, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the American Jewish Congress, People for the American Way, the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion, the Police Executives Research Forum, the Criminal Justice Statistics Admini-
stration, the International Association of Police Chiefs, the National Council of
Churches, the National Coalition of American Nuns, and the American Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee.
'0 See generally Grattet et al., supra note 31, at 288; Jenness, supra note 58, at 42-43
(on the development of hate crime law in the U.S,, with focus on its social, political,
and legal precursors).
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to the list of provisions in federal hate crime law. 6' Through di-
rect and sustained testimony, gay and lesbian advocates were
able to bestow empirical credibility upon the violence con-
nected with this provision (i.e., antigay violence). In addition,
they successfully engaged in discursive tactics that rendered the
meaning of sexual orientation more similar to (rather than dis-
similar from) the meanings already attached to race, religion,
and ethnicity. By successfully engaging in these linking strate-
gies of persuasion, advocates represeriting gays and lesbians
proved crucial to the expansion of hate crime law to cover sex-
ual orientation, thereby ensuring that gays and lesbians are rou-
tinely recognized as victims of bias crime.
In contrast, other status provisions initially recommended
for inclusion in the law, but not added to the bill prior to its
passage, did not attract significant, sustained advocacy and social
movement mobilization in congressional hearings. For exam-
ple, prior to the passage of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, at
least eight Senators argued: "we believe that the measure does
not go far enough and include violence by and against union
members."r Since hearings were not held on this type of bias-
motivated violence (see Table 2), there was not a structural op-
portunity for representatives from unions to establish the em-
pirical credibility of the problem and thus legitimate this
provision; as a result, union affiliation was not adopted as a pro-
vision in federal hate crime law.
This same pattern applies to claims about children, the eld-
erly, and police officers: all were status provisions proposed
early in federal lawmaking but never adopted as core elements
of federal hate crime law, in large part because none of these
target groups had advocates lobbying Congress to include them
6 1Jenness, supra note 58, at 42-43, 49-73.
62 Claims are empirically credible "to the extent that there arc events and occur-
rences that can be pointed to as documentary evidence." David A. Snow & Robert D.
Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIEPS IN SOCIAL MO.TEENT THEMO"
140 (Aldon C. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992). As Gamson notes, how-
ever, the term credibility "contains a subtle hedge." WILLIAM GAMsON, TALK -,
PoLnrcs 69 (1992). It is not that the claims have been proven true, but that they have
the appearance of truth. In this case, advocates for gays and lesbians successfully made
the case that violence against gays and lesbians was as epidemic and consequential as
violence against people of color, immigrants, andJews. Jenness, supra note 58, at 70.
6'Jenness, supra note 31, passim.
' Hate Crime Statistics Act, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiwary, 101st Cong.
87 (1989).
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in federal lawmaking on hate crime. Representative John
Conyers, Jr., the legislator primarily responsible for initiating
and sustaining federal hearings on hate crime, conceded the
importance of social movement organizations and other activist
groups when he explained why, at least early on in federal law-
making on hate crime, some statuses were included and others
were not:
The reason we did not include octogenarians who are assaulted is
because there was no testimony that suggested that they ought to be, as
awful as the crimes visited upon them are, and the reason we did not ac-
count for policemen killed in the line of duty, although police organiza-
tions do, is that there was no request that they be separated out from the
uniform crime statistics.6
Senator Gekas, who opposed the inclusion of sexual orien-
tation being based primarily on the presence and persuasive
politics of gay and lesbian advocates, immediately responded to
Representative Conyers:
If the only criterion is to have the gay rights organization have its
request acceded to by inclusion in that, I say to the Members that the
gentleman should join with me now in a motion to recommit, to put this
bill back into committee and allow the inclusion in this bill of statistics to
be gathered on the incidence of child abuse, of attacks on the elderly, at-
tacks on policemen, and attacks on other groups which might for one
reason or another be victims of such type of crime.
The reverse of this pattern, particular only to the later phase
of lawmaking, is further evidenced by the history of the disabili-
ties provision in federal hate crime law. Although "the Congress
apparently did not think that disabled people compromised
[sic] a 'high risk' group in relation to interpersonal violence""7
when it first contemplated hate crime legislation, disability was
later added to federal hate crime law via the reauthorization of
the Hate Crime Statistics Act, the original and final formulation
of the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, and the cur-
rent formulation of the Hate Crime Prevention Act. The chang-
ing character of federal hate crime law along these lines
occurred despite the fact that federal lawmakers have never
held a hearing on violence directed at those with disabilities as a
" 134 CONG. REc. 11393 (daily ed. May 18, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Conyers).
134 CONG. REc. 11403 (daily ed. May 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gekas).67Waxman, supra note 45, at 186.
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type of hate crime and no protest occurred over this provision (see
Table 2). Moreover, the official records of federal level hate
crime lawmaking reveal that representatives from the disability
rights movement have yet to offer testimony related to federal
hate crime legislation (see Table 2).6' Nonetheless, later in the
history of federal lawmaking on hate crime, the inclusion of dis-
abilities in federal hate crime law occurred in light of the fact
that disability-like race, religion, and gender-was already a
standard subject of federal discrimination law. In large part,
this occurred because of the earlier passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act in 1990,69 which ensured that "disabilities"
had a home in federal civil rights legislation."'
C. "DISABILITIES" AS A SECOND-CLASS CITIZEN IN HATE CRIME LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
As the above examination of both the federal and state laws
reveal, the provision for disabilities has found a home in hate
crime legislation, but it remains somewhat in the basement of
that home. First, after more than twenty years of lawmaking in
response to bias-violence, only half the states have laws that
cover disabilities (see Figure 1). And while all three of the fed-
eral laws now contain provisions for "disabilities," these provi-
sions were only included as afterthoughts.
Second, both the federal and state efforts to collect data on
bias crimes directed at people with disabilities have lagged be-
hind efforts to collect data on the other types of bias crimes.
For example, as mandated by the Hate Crime Statistics Act, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation began to collect bias crime data
as part of the Uniform Crime Report in 1990. However, consis-
tent with the late arrival of "disabilities" as a status provision, the
FBI only began to report figures for violence against persons
with disabilities in 1997 (see Table 1). Even then, the FBI re-
ported only thirteen cases of hate crimes directed against peo-
ple with disabilities nationwide (see Table 1). Given the size of
the disability population, it seems highly likely that there is a se-
vere underreporting of the hate crimes committed against this
class of people. Similarly, at the state level, reporting efforts
have been delayed. For example, California-with more than
'Jenness, supra note 58, at 554-55, 566.
'42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
"Jenness, supra note 58, at 567; JENNS & GRATIET, supra note 12, at 71-72.
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four and a half million people with disabilities (more than
twenty percent of the population) and a fifty-two percent in-
crease in the number of persons classified as having develop-
mental disabilities between 1985 and 1986 71-has only been
publishing hate crime statistics since 1995. Specifically, from
1995-1998, California reported three or fewer cases of hate
crimes directed at people with disabilities. Given the marginal
status of disability in the laws and the fact that victims of such
crimes are frequently unable to garner the full attention of the
criminal justice system, it seems highly likely that this number is
an underestimate.72
Third, police training publications and curriculum at fed-
eral, state, and local level tend to discuss disability-based hate
crime only infrequently, if at all.73 For example, in the definitive
national bias-crime training manual for law enforcement and
victim assistance professionals, none of the "bias crime indica-
tors" and illustrative cases relate to victims who were selected
because of their disabilities. 7 As a result, disability-based hate
crime remains largely invisible to front-line law enforcers, who
tend to focus mostly on race, religion, sexual orientation, and
nationality. This incomplete focus, in turn, results in an under-
reporting of crimes motivated by someone's disability.
Fourth, there have been no appellate cases dealing with the
disability provision. Most of the case law throughout the 1990s
dealt with hate crimes based upon race, religion, and national
origin-the triad of categories embedded earliest in the law.
Later on, appellate courts considered sexual orientation and
gender cases. The lack of disability-based hate crime cases may
suggest that prosecutors were most concerned with applying the
laws to "familiar" kinds of hate crime cases.75 It may be harder
for prosecutors to perceive crimes against persons with disabili-
ties as hate crimes, even though half the state laws in existence
7 1 Joan Petersilia, Persons with Developmental Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System:
Victims, Defendants, and Inmates 1 (1999b) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
72 CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 39, at 32-40.
7 3JENNESS & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 142.7
, KARENA. MCLAUGHLIN, ELLY BRILLIANT, & CYNTHIA LONG, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE,
NATIONAL BLAs CRIMES TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND VICIM ASSISTANCE
PROFESSIONALS 35-41 (1995).
" Scott Phillips & Ryken Grattet, Judicial Rhetoric, Meaning-making, and the Institu-
tionalization ofHate Crime Law, 34 L & SOC'YREV. 584, 584 (2000).
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cover them. As a result, the special problems the disability
status provision might present have not been subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny.
The bottom line is that as both a legislative provision and
practical issue, the connection between the legal and concep-
tual definition of "hate crime" and "disabilities" is tenuous. Dis-
abilities provisions remain less embedded in hate crime law
than do the race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and
gender provisions. Yet, while people with disabilities remain less
visible as victims of hate crime than the other minority groups
(e.g., blacks, Jews, and immigrants) included in the laws, they
are still more visible than other groups that have been proposed
(e.g., union members, octogenarians, the elderly, children, po-
lice officers, etc.).
A comparison along these lines reveals that the inclusion of
status provisions in the law is, in the first instance, an outgrowth
of social movement mobilization, the presence of interest
groups, and the dynamics of lawmaking. As Jenness and Grat-
tet conclude, "as with other social constructions, especially
those imbued with criminal meaning, hate crime can first and
foremost be seen as an outgrowth of the interplay between so-
cial movement activism, policymakers, the law (i.e., judges, po-
lice, and law enforcement), and the meanings they engender."
Acknowledging the validity of this statement, it is nonetheless
crucial to ask: upon what criteria should the selection of "target
groups"' for inclusion in hate crime law proceed, especially if it
is desirable to have the law reflect something other than mere
"identity politics"?"
76JENNEss & GRATrEr supra note 12, at 155.
nSoule & Earl, supra note 35, at 3.
7'Jacobs and Potter echo much of the critical commentary about hate crime laws.
At the core of their criticism is a rejection of hate crime statutes for being rooted in
"identity politics." In their words, "the passage of hate crime law in the 1980s and
1990s is best explained by the growing influence of identity politics in American law-
making" JACOBS & PorrER, supra note 11, at 65. They argue that hate crime laws are
symbolic statements requested by advocacy groups for material and symbolic reasons
and provided by politicians for political reasons. Thus, from their vantage point, hate
crime laws are a perfect example of legislators ceding the policynaking process to in-
terest groups. As a result, the laws merely represent an exercise in symbolic politics.
As such, they argue, hate crime policy is more likely to engender divisiveness than to
ameliorate pressing problems, and are problematic as a result.
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IV. KEY CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING STATUS PROVISIONS IN HATE
CRIME LAW'
As Laurence Tribe, constitutional law professor at Harvard
University, explained to Congress, "nothing in the United States
Constitution prevents the Government from penalizing with
added severity those crimes directed against people or their
property because of their race, color, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, and nothing in the Con-
stitution requires that this list be infinitely expanded."8  Not
surprisingly, then, throughout the history of social movement
and legislative activity that has resulted in the enactment of the
hate crime laws discussed above, there has been considerable
controversy over what groups should be protected by hate crime
legislation.81
This determination and attendant differentiation is signifi-
cant. It affects the kinds of people protected, and thus the
kinds of violence prosecutors can pursue as hate crimes. It also
affects which minority groups are legally recognizable as victims
of hate crime. More importantly, it reflects the selection of one
choice over another when faced with the dilemma of difference.
Specifically, to include a status provision serves-rightly or
wrongly, accurately or inaccurately-to demarcate the en-
hanced vulnerabilities of some types of people and inscribe vic-
tim statuses on some minority groups and not others. Here,
race is a proxy for non-Whites, religion is a proxy for non-
Christians, sexual orientation is a proxy for gays and lesbians,
gender is a proxy for girls and women, etc. In contrast, to
7 It should be clear that in what follows, we take up the question of what status
provisions should be included in hate crime laws rather than whether or not hate
crime laws are rooted in valid legal principles. The legal literature contains many as-
sessments of the latter issue. It is interesting to note, however, that while the law re-
view literature has been largely negative towards the laws, courts have been more
receptive. We begin with the pragmatic presumption that the core principles behind
hate crime laws are valid and will be treated as such for the foreseeable future. Thus,
the present issue concerns what the limits of the law should be rather than whether
or not the laws should exist at all. See George C. Thomas III, On Trial: Laws Against
Hate Crimes, 36 CiuM. L. BULL. 3 (2000). It is also important to stress that the question
is not whether or not all crimes against persons with disabilities should be converted
to hate crimes. Clearly, not all crimes againstJews are hate crimes. The issue is when,
where, and how hate crime enhancements should be applied to crimes against per-
sons with disabilities.
80 Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d CONG. 7 (1992) (statement of Laurence Tribe).
" Jenness, supra note 58, passim.
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forego including a status provision serves to render such social
differences invisible in both the social and legal lexicon.
To determine what distinctions are to be made in the law,
social scientists, legal scholars, and advocates for minority
groups have identified many grounds upon which the inclusion
of select status provisions can be justified, as well as many
grounds upon which the exclusion of select provisions can be
justified. Continuing with our focus on "disabilities," a system-
atic consideration of key criteria is useful for assessing the viabil-
ity of orienting toward any form of group membership as an axis
along which bias-motivated violence occurs and is thus legally
recognized as a "hate crime."
Frederick Lawrence distinguishes bias crimes from other
crimes-what he refers to as "parallel crimes"-by arguing that
the former are far worse than the latter because "a bias crime
occurs not because the victim is whw he is, but rather because
the victim is what he is."" With this distinction as a starting
point, in his book Punishing Hate: Bias Crime Under American
Law,83 Lawrence addresses the question of which status charac-
teristics should be written into hate crime law and which ones
should be excluded. He proposes a "proper methodology for
going about constructing such a list."'  This methodology
hinges upon moving beyond simply identifying select constitu-
encies victimized by violence and toward an assessment of mul-
tiple factors associated with candidate constituencies, including
the presence of a group identity, evidence of historical dis-
crimination, and distinctions between types of discrimination
and bias motivations. An examination of the way in which these
factors contextualize crime provides a lens through which the
inclusion of disabilities in hate crime law can be understood and
assessed as a policy response to violence directed towards peo-
ple with disabilities and the dilemma of difference more gener-
ally.
A. PRESENCE OF A GROUP IDENTITY
Lawrence's methodology is attentive to "self-regarding
groups" and not "random collections of people."5 That is, for a
8' LAWREN CE, supra note 14, at 9.
3Id.
" Id. at 13.
"Id. at 14.
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group to be recognized in hate crime law requires that some
portion of society view such a collection of people as an identifi-
able group of persons who, to some degree, maintain a collec-
tive identity.8 6 Two of the most cited scholars on the topic,
sociologists Taylor and Whittier, describe a collective identity as
"the shared definition of a group that derives from members'
common interests, experiences, and solidarity." 7 For social psy-
chologists and social movement scholars alike, "individuals see
themselves as part of a group when some shared characteristic
becomes salient and is defined as important, resulting in a sense
of 'we-ness'."M This "we-ness," in turn, often implies opposition
to other groups and/or the dominant social order. 9 To be con-
crete, various groups of people of color, Jews, people from other
countries with non-American identities, gays and lesbians, and
girls and women qualify along these lines, but blue-eyed people,
people who prefer casual dress to formal dress, and people who
come from one-parent families do not.
Two sources of evidence suggest that persons with disabili-
ties comprise a "self-regarding group." First, survey data sug-
gests that persons with disabilities do, indeed, feel a common
identity with one another and see themselves as minorities in
the same sense as people who are black or Hispanic.9° Second,
persons with disabilities have, over the last two decades,
emerged to comprise no small sector of the modem civil rights
movement. Shapiro's book, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging
a New Civil Rights Movement, demonstrates that people with dis-
abilities have done so by constituting a "self-regarding group" in
the form of a distinct political entity.9' Much like people of
color, gays and lesbians, and women, people with disabilities
constitute an identifiable sector of a larger civil rights move-
ment in the United States that has increasingly made demands
6 Verta Taylor & Nancy Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities:
Lesbian Feminist Mobilization, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104-29 (Aldon
C. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
"Id. at 105.
ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL
NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63-67 (1989); Taylor & Whittier, supra note 87, at
105; Alain Touraine, An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements, 52 SOC. RES. 749
(1985).
89 MELUCCI, supra note 89, at 66; Taylor & Whittier, supra note 87, at 105.
Louis HARRIS & Assoc., THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING
DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 7 (1986).
91 SHAPIRO, supra note 56, at 111.
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on the political system as people with disabilities. As Shapiro de-
tails:
... it did not matter if disability came at birth or later, whether the per-
son was rich or poor, or even if it did not interfere with one's accom-
plishments. To be disabled meant to fight someone else's reality. Other
people's attitudes, not one's own disability, were the biggest barrier.
This frustration gave rise to the ardor behind the disability rights move-92
ment.
Representative Tony Coelho of California argued that "the
strength of the disability movement came from a 'hidden army'
of people who had an instinctive understanding of the stigma of
being disabled."9 3
B. EVIDENCE OF HISTORICAL DISCRIMINATION
Every "self-regarding group," however, is not an equally vi-
able contender for inclusion in hate crime law. Rather, those
constituencies sharing a characteristic that implicates "classic
societal fissure lines" or "divisions that run deep in the social
history of a culture" are prime candidates.9 Indeed, the domi-
nant conception of hate crimes, evident in congressional de-
bates,9 popular media sources, 95 and the testimony of interest
group actors,97 is one in which the targets of hate crimes are mi-
norities of one kind or another and who historically have been
victims of racism, nativism, heterosexism, and religious persecu-
tion-blacks, Mexicans, gays and lesbians, andJews, respectively.
In sharp contrast to the research conducted on the other
categories included in hate crime laws and for which there is
ample evidence of a long term pattern of discrimination and
violence,98 historians, criminologists, activists, and various state
2Id. at 112.
Id. at 117.
LAwRENCE, supra note 14, at 12.
'Jenness, supra note 58, passim.
LEmv & McDEvHn, supra note 49, passim;JENNEss & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 3.
"Jenness, supra note 58, passim
9SeeJOHN BOSWELL, C ;iANrrv, SocAL TOLERANCE, AND HososExUAWnY 51-52
(1980); JACoBS & PoTIER, supra note 11, at 391; JONATHAN N. KA'z, GAY AmEIcmm,
HISTORY' LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 16-120 (1976); NE. K. KRESSEL, MASS
HATE: THE GLOBAL RISE OF GENOCIDE AND TERROR 2-8 (1996); MixcHAEL NE',roN & JUDY
ANN NE -ON, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS VIoLENCE IN AmRICA: A CHRONOLOGY passlm
(1991); Carole J. Sheffield, Hate Volence, in RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN THE UNITED
STATES 388 (Paula Rothenberg, ed., 1992); Gad Bensinger, Hate Crimes: A New/Old
Problem, 16 INT'LJ. COMPi. & APPLIED CRmI. JusT. 115 (1992); Maroncy, supra note 18,
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agencies have only recently begun to document the influence of
disabilities as a predisposing factor in discriminatory violence.
Although most violence against persons with disabilities is hid-
den from view, researchers have begun to document a variety of
forms of violence directed towards persons with disabilities,
from symbolic to fatal assaults involving a range of perpetrators,
and from intimates to strangers to institutions such as the state
and medicine.99 This includes "assisted suicides" of severely dis-
abled people, parental participation in the starvation of disabled
newborns in hospitals, sexual abuse in the isolation of the nu-
clear family, routine physical abuse in institutional settings, and
an array of medical practices legitimized as necessary, such as
electro-convulsive therapy, psychosurgery, eugenic sterilization,
medical experimentation, and extensive medicating and adverse
behavioral modification.'0° It also includes seemingly "random
violence"' '° in the public sphere.
With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act' 2 in
1990, the United States government recognized "that disabled
persons have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment."0 0 3 Harlan Hahn's work suggests that, at least in part,
this unequal treatment resulted because both historically and in
the current era, people with disabilities have been positioned as
inferior, thereby leading to centuries of systematic discrimina-
tion.' O4 In perhaps the most cited work on the topic, Dick Sob-
sey points to the cultural exosystem-the cultural and social
beliefs about disability-that has contributed to the differential
treatment of people with disabilities, as well as patterned and
predictable violence against those with disabilities for centu-
at 564. See generallyJane Caputi, To Acknowledge and to Heal: 20 Years of Feminist Thought
and Activism on Sexual Violence, in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION: GENERATIONS OF
FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP 340 (Cheris Kramarae & Dale Spender eds., 1992) (reviewing
feminist activism on sexual violence in the U.S. and abroad).
CRIME VIcIMS, supra note 39, at 20.
"' Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundation of a Political
Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181-85 (Alan Gartner & Tom
Joe eds., 1987); Waxman, supra note 45, at 185.
"'1 See generallyJOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK ABOuT NEW CRIMES AND
NEW VICTIMS (1999) (examining the social construction and public perception of vio-
lence in the U.S., especially seemingly unpredictable violence).
102 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
'03 See id. § 12101(2) (7).
104 Hahn, supra note 101, at 184.
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ries.'5 With regard to the latter, Petersilia's recent work cor-
roborates this view. She found that people with developmental
disabilities are four to ten times more likely to be crime victims
than people without a disability.05 Moreover, children with any
kind of disability are more than twice as likely as nondisabled
children to be physically abused and almost twice as likely to be
sexually abused.'O Consistent with these findings, Waxman ob-
served that "disabled people face a pattern of oppressive societal
treatment and hatred, much as women face misogeny [sic], gay
men and lesbians face homophobia, Jews face antisemitism, and
people of color face racism.
Taken together, this research suggests that the visibility of
violence against persons with disabilities is where the visibility of
violence directed at people of color, girls and women, and gays
and lesbians was not so long ago. That is, what was once invisi-
ble is becoming increasingly recognized. Private pain and vio-
lence are increasingly being perceived as public problems,
requiring governmental response. Moreover, violence is being
increasingly seen as not merely epiphenomenal to the subordi-
nation of persons with disabilities, but as central to its mainte-
109
nance.
C. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF DISCRIINATION AND BIAS
MOTIVATIONS
To simply document how different groups-racial, relig-
ious, and ethnic minorities, as well as gays and lesbians, women,
and people with disabilities-are differentially vulnerable to
crime does not, in and of itself, constitute prima facie evidence
of hate crime. To further demarcate how bias crimes are differ-
ent from parallel crimes, Berk, Boyd, and Hamner make a use-
ful distinction between actuarial and symbolic crimes. In their
words:
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the broad observation by
Grimshaw (1969b), Sterba (1969), and Nieburg (1972) that one key in-
gredient in hate-motivated violence is the 'symbolic status' of the victim.
"0' DICKSOBSEY, VIOLENCE AND ABUSE IN THE LIVES OF PEOPLE WrrH DisABaLrms: THE
END OFSILENTACEPTANCE? 13-17 (1994).
;0' Petersilia, supra note 72, at 3.
' Id,
' Waxman, supra note 45, at 187.
'P GIME VICnMS, supra note 39, at 10-20.
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Thus Grimshaw (1969b, p. 254) speaks of violence as 'social' when 'it is
directed against an individual or his property solely or primarily because
of his membership in a social category.' A social category is defined by
one or more attributes that a set of individuals share, which have impli-
cations for how the individuals are perceived or treated."
0
Accordingly, symbolic crimes are best envisioned as social
crimes because the victims are selected precisely because of
what they symbolize. The crime is committed for expressive
reasons. The most vivid historical example of this is perhaps the
lynching of blacks where the corpses were then displayed in
communities to send a message to other blacks and whites who
sympathized with the plight of the blacks."' A more recent ex-
ample is the incident that occurred in Laramie, Wyoming,
where Matthew Shepard, a young gay man, was robbed, pistol-
whipped, tied to a fence, and left to die by two young men who
were offended by his homosexuality."2 In each case, the indi-
vidual had been victimized in order to convey a message to the
larger community. As Representative Conyers explained when
trying to convince his fellow legislators of the importance of
hate crime legislation,
Hate crimes, which can range from threats and vandalism to arson,
assault, and murder, are intended to not just harm the victim, but to
send a message of intimidation to an entire community of people. [Be-
cause of this added element] Hate crimes are extraordinary in nature
and require a special government response.113
In contrast to symbolic crimes, actuarial crimes involve the se-
lection of a victim based on his/her real or imagined social
characteristic(s), but not for expressive or symbolic reasons.
Rather, actuarial crimes are done for instrumental reasons. As
Berk, Boyd, and Hamner explain, "people routinely make lay es-
timates of central tendencies associated with particular social
categories.. '" 4 These assessments play into all sorts of choices
criminals make prior to engaging in criminal conduct. For ex-
ample, a group of perpetrators may purposely assault and rob a
gay man not because of what his sexual orientation represents
10 Berk et al., supra note 19, at 127.
.. THE Ku KLUx KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE 16 (Sara Bullard, ed.
1991).
"'Joshua Hammer, The 'Gay Panic'Defense: Accused Says He Killed Matthew Shepard in
a Rage Triggered by Memories of a Childhood Assault, NEwSwEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 40.
' 134 CONG. REC. 11393 (daily ed. May 18, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
114 Berk et al., supra note 19, at 128.
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to them, but because they apply a stereotype to him that is an-
chored in the notion that gay men are effeminate and thus less
inclined to resist assault. Alternatively, a group of perpetrators
may purposely assault and rob ajewish man not because of what
Jewishness represents to them, but because they apply a stereo-
type to him that is anchored in the notion that Jews have more
money than gentiles, thus they are more likely to "pay-off" than
random victims of assault and robbery. In a similar fashion, a
group of perpetrators may purposely assault and rob a person in
a wheelchair not because of their antipathy toward persons with
disabilities, but because they apply a stereotype to him that is
anchored in the notion that persons with disabilities are less in-
clined to resist, unable to seek assistance, unlikely to evoke the
attention of authorities, and/or unable to testify about victimi-
zation when authorities are attentive. In each of these exam-
ples, the victim's symbolic status is used to retrieve relevant
"factual" information about him/her as a likely crime victim, not
as a member of a social category held in ill-repute. In other
words, it is this factual information, mediated through some
imagined actuarial table, that motivates the crime, not bigotry.
"This distinction between symbolic and actuarial crimes suggests
a potentially useful boundary between hate-motivated crimes
and other offenses, ' even though in many cases making clear
empirical distinctions can be difficult. Nonetheless, Berk, Boyd,
and Hamner conclude that "perhaps the essential feature of
hate-motivated crimes is their symbolic content. Crimes moti-
vated solely by the victim's actuarial status would seem best in-
cluded in another category.""
6
Related to the distinction between symbolic and actuarial
crimes, a distinction can be made between "two analytically dis-
tinct, but somewhat overlapping [statutory] models of bias
crimes", 17 : the discriminatory selection model and the racial
animus model. Each of these models assumes the presence of
discrimination in the selection of crime victims. Each model,
however, posits different criteria for assessing what does and
does not equal bias or hate crime. Accordingly, each model is
relevant to the consideration of persons with disabilities as vic-
tims of hate crime.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 131.
"1 LAWRFNCE, supra note 14, at 29-30.
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The discriminato7y selection model defines hate crime solely on
the basis of the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of a vic-
tim, regardless of why such a selection was made. For example,
like girls and women, people with disabilities may be targeted
simply because they are perceived to be more vulnerable vic-
tims. Consistent with the development of sexual harassment
law,' 8 the reasons or motivations for the discrimination-in this
case, differential selection-are irrelevant to the applicability of
the law. As the Court of Appeals of Florida has stated in regard
to Florida's hate crime law,
[I] t does not matter why a woman is treated differently than a man,
a black differently than a white, a Catholic differently than ajew; it mat-
ters only that they are. So also with section 775.085 [Florida's hate crime
statute]. It doesn't matter that Dobbins hated Jewish people or why he
hated them; it only mattered that he discriminated against Daly by beat-
ing him because he was Jewish. 1
9
With this view, victim selection based upon vulnerability
would be punished the same as a situation where a victim was se-
lected to express hatred. In other words, the discriminatory se-
lection model does not distinguish between symbolic and
actuarial crimes. It is inclusive of both kinds. It is also the most
popular form of the law, with roughly two-thirds of the state laws
and the existing and proposed federal laws based upon it."20 Fi-
nally, this form of the law was legitimated in 1993 in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,'21 the first case in which the Supreme Court expressly
sustained a modem bias crime law.
11 2
In sharp contrast, the racial animus model focuses attention
on the reason for the discriminatory selection of victims. This
approach assumes that the motivation for the selection of a vic-
tim is less instrumental and more expressive; perpetrators use
the act of victimization to express animus toward the category of
persons the victim represents (i.e., a person of color, a homo-
sexual, a Jew, a disabled person, etc.). As such, the racial ani-
mus model follows the distinction between actuarial and
symbolic crimes by defining the former as beyond the domain
"8 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1687
(1998).
.. Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
'2'JENNESS & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 87.
121 Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
' LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 30-34; Phillips & Grattet, supra note 76, at 584.
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of the law and the latter within the desirable domain of hate
crime law. As Lawrence explains,
This model is consonant with the classical understanding of preju-
dice as involving more than differential treatment on the basis of the vic-
tim's race. This understanding of prejudice, as reflected in the racial
animus model of bias crimes, requires that the offender have committed
the crime with some measure of hostility toward the victim's racial group
and/or toward the victim because he is part of that group.
Interestingly, this model of bias crime is evident in the regula-
tions promulgated by the FBI to implement the Hate Crimes
Statistics Act.04 These regulations define bias crime conduct as
that which is motivated, in whole or in part, by a "preformed
negative opinion or attitude toward a group of persons based on
their race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orienta-
tion."In5
By definition, all cases falling under the rubric of the racial
animus model are also cases that fall under the rubric of the
discriminatory selection model, but not vice-versa. Thus, the ra-
cial animus model implies a more stringent approach to hate
crime than does the discriminatory selection. From Lawrence's
legally and politically strategic point of view, the discriminatory
selection errs on the side of over-inclusion. He argues that a fo-
cus on the racial animus model is preferable precisely because
of the type bigotry it implicates and the harm it encapsulates.
With regard to the latter, Lawrence argues that "bias crimes
ought to receive punishment that is more severe than that im-
posed on parallel crimes" because "they cause greater harm
than parallel crimes to the immediate victim of the crime, the
target community of the crime, and the general society."' This
argument draws on an array of ideas from theories of punish-
ment to posit that there are two elements of a crime that de-
scribe its seriousness: culpability of the offender and harm
caused by society.
21
- LAxwRNcE, supra note 14, at 34.
24 Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275 (1990).
" Model Penal Code §§ 2.06, 5.02 (1985).
'
2 LAWRENcE, supra note 14, at 34, 44.
In a lengthy discussion in a chapter devoted to addressing the question "'Why
are Bias Crimes Worse?," Lawrence argues that "the culpability associated with bias
crimes makes these crimes more severe than parallel crimes" and that "a harm-based
analysis demonstrates that bias crimes are more serious than parallel crimes."
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Compared to the discriminatory selection model, however,
the racial animus model has had a considerably more difficult
time marshaling appellate court approval. The United States
Supreme Court and the supreme courts of Washington and
NewJersey2 have struck down laws, in whole or in part, because
they relied on phrasing that went beyond mere bias intent. In
addition, in State v. Stadler"0 the Florida Supreme Court stated
that its law, which required "evidence of prejudice," should be
interpreted as a discriminatory selection law, regardless of the
specific wording of the statute. Thus, while the animus model is
desirable insofar as it targets bigotry directly, its weaker juris-
prudential foundation in antidiscrimination principles renders
it more vulnerable to constitutional challenges.
Both the discriminatory selection model and the racial ani-
mus model can be applied to the case of violence against per-
sons with disabilities. With regard to the latter model, some
evidence suggests that persons with disabilities face higher rates
of victimization not because perpetrators harbor ill-will toward
those with disabilities, but because people with disabilities are in
vulnerable situations. According to the Office for Victims of
Crime:
Another reality is that many offenders are motivated by a desire to
obtain control over the victim and measure their potential prey for vul-
nerabilities. Many people with disabilities, because they are perceived as
unable to physically defend themselves, or identify the attacker, or call
for help, are perfect targets for such offenders. Just as many pedophiles
gravitate to youth serving occupations, so do many other predators seek
work as caregivers to people with disabilities. Indeed, in one survey, vir-
tually half-48.1 percent-of the perpetrators of sexual abuse against per-
sons with disabilities had gained access to their victims through disability
services.
It is difficult to grant credibility to any claims about the pre-
cise motivational nature of such crimes since there is so little
systematic evidence on the subject. Assuming, however, for the
moment that this is an accurate empirical portrayal of such
crimes, the type of bias crime persons with disabilities face can
LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 60-61. Therefore, he concludes, enhanced penalties for
bias-motivated crimes are appropriate.
'2R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
"' State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192 (1993); State v. Kearns, 136 NJ. 56 (1994).
" State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072 (Florida S. Ct. 1994).
"' CHERYL GUIDRY TYISKA, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, WORKiNG wrrH VICIMS OF CIUME
WirHDisABi=rnES4 (1998).
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be thus characterized as discriminatory, but not animus-
motivated.
At the same time, however, violence directed toward people
with disabilities can be characterized as motivated by animus.
Katz and his colleagues' work,3 2 for example, suggest that non-
disabled people have a tendency to dislike those who arouse
fear or guilt in them (i.e., people with disabilities), and perceive
people with disabilities as inferior and responsible for their own
fate. They are, in essence, "deserving victims." Similarly,
Hahn's work suggests that violence directed toward those with
disabilities is an outgrowth of fear best characterized by existen-
tial anxiety--the fear of others whose visible traits are perceived
as disturbing or unpleasant-which gets expressed as hatred to-
ward people with disabilities.'33 Consistently, Shapiro's book
provides ample evidence that persons with disabilities have his-
torically been despised and stigmatized by those without dis-
abilities. This has resulted in the latter denigrating, segregating,
and, on occasion, outright attacking the former.' As Waxman
concluded, "the contention that vulnerability is the primary ex-
planation for disability-related violence is too superficial.
Rather, hatred is the primary cause, and vulnerability only pro-
vides an opportunity for offenders to express their hatred. In-
deed, people who are respected and considered equal are not
generally abused."' ' Supporting this view, Longmore and Bou-
via describe disability-related violence as a reflection of growing
hostility toward those who require and increasingly demand al-
ternative physical and social arrangements to accommodate
them. 3
In the end, these various ways of envisioning the parameters
of motivation or bias-intent may prove to be a difference with-
out distinction. Jenness and Grattet's work on hate crime as a
"policy domain"' 7 suggests that since the invention of the term
"2 IRWIN KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGicALANALYSIS, 16-21 (1981); Irwin Katz
et al., Ambivalence, Guilt, and the Denigration of a Physically Handicapped Viarm, 45(3) J.
Pzaso Au= 419 (1977).
'Hahn, supra note 101, at 181.
"u Waxman, supra note 45, at 185.
'Id. at 191.
'Paul Longmore & Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice Issues, 3
LAW& MED. 141 (1987).
'7 Borrowing from Burstein, Jenness and Grattet use the term policy domain to
denote "components of the political system organized around substantive issues."
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"hate crime" in the late 1970s, lawmakers and judges have in-
creasingly agreed that the parameters of the discriminatory se-
lection model provide the most legitimate foundation for
modem hate crime law. Early in the history of hate crime law,
lawmakers experimented with four distinct ways of phrasing the
intent standard as they grappled with how to write hate crime
law. However, as Figure 2 reveals, by 1990 two forms of motiva-
tional phrasing-the "because of' wording and "intent to harass
or intimidate" wording-began to emerge as the most popular.
Finally, after 1993, the "because of" phrasing became the domi-
nant form, with roughly half of the adopting states using such
language. Thus, the emergent legitimate form of the law does
not distinguish between mere bias-intent and hatred. Similarly,
appellate court decisions on hate crime cases have, over time,
increasingly endorsed the "because of' phrasing in hate crime
law. In so doing, courts have maintained that it does not matter
what political views or ideologies motivated the act. Rather, all
that matters is that a victim was selected "because of" their race,
religion, ancestry, etc., quite apart from the degree of malice in-
volved on the part of the perpetrator.' 38 This "causation" has
caused some to shift from using the term "hate" crime to the
term "bias" crime. Presumably, the same logic would apply to
violence directed at persons with disabilities. These trends in
lawmaking and judicial decision-making suggest that the least
stringent form of motivational phrasing, which maps onto the
discriminatory selection model, is increasingly dominant.
Having articulated a set of criteria by which "disabilities"
could be considered a candidate for inclusion in state and fed-
eral hate crime law, it is now appropriate to return to a consid-
eration of what this end result would mean for the "dilemma of
difference." Accordingly, in the conclusion that follows, the ap-
plicability of "disabilities" to hate crime law is examined in light
of its consequences for particularly conceiving of persons with
disabilities and generally conceiving of minority groups as both
different from and the same as "others."
Paul Burstein, Policy Domains: Organization, Culture, and Policy Outcomes, 17 ANN. REv.
Soc. 327, 327 (1991);JENNESS & GRATET, supra note 12, at 6.
.. Phillips & Grattet, supra note 76, at 584-85.
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V. HATE CRIME LAW, DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE, AND LMPLICATIONS
This article describes the general framework and principles
underlying an evolving body of hate crime law, indicating how
disabilities, as a status provision, might "fit" within its basic pa-
rameters. The consistency of disabilities within the hate crime
law framework, however, does not directly address the desirabil-
ity of including or emphasizing it--or any other provision, for
that matter-from the standpoint of the dilemma of difference.
As suggested at the outset of this article, the dilemma of differ-
ence encourages consideration of the practical and political
significance of public policies built around the goal of increas-
ing inclusion for particular minority groups. The dilemma is
whether those policies should treat a minority group the same
as other groups in society or whether the policies should offer
them special treatment. As Minow succinctly explained, "the di-
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lemma of difference may be posed as a choice between integra-
tion and separation, as a choice between similar treatment and
special treatment, or as a choice between neutrality and ac-
commodation."'39
The dilemma of difference and alternative resolutions to
the dilemma of difference are manifest in contemporary poli-
cies that surround persons with disabilities in particular, as well
as in hate crime law more generally. For example, the former
manifestation is most evident in some of the alternatives offered
during the Department of Justice's 1998 Symposium on Working
with Crime Victims with Disabilities.40 The policy proposals con-
tained in this position statement are divided into three general
areas: physical accessibility, networking and training, and direct
services. Changes in each of these areas can be undertaken with
the dilemma of difference in mind. For example, increases in
accessibility can be accomplished according to so-called "univer-
sal design" principles, where the idea is to construct environ-
ments and communication tools usable "to the greatest extent
possible by the broadest number of users including children,
older adults, people with disabilities, people of atypical size or
shape, people who are ill or injured, and people inconven-
ienced by circumstances." 4 1 Such an approach would allow for
the inclusion of people with disabilities without distinguishing
them as "special." Likewise, proposals regarding law enforce-
ment training encourage fostering a recognition of and respon-
siveness to persons with disabilities as potential and actual
victims of crime. Here, the content of the educational message
is crucial. Officials must be made to move beyond their assump-
tions about persons with disabilities as pitiable and, instead,
emphasize that accommodating and including persons with dis-
abilities is, in fact, a matter of entitlement, not charity. Educa-
tional efforts therefore need to simultaneously encourage
officials to recognize that crimes against persons with disabilities
regularly happen and challenge the initial assumptions those of-
ficials might have about persons with disabilities.
The point of implementing these types of changes is to in-
crease recognition and accessibility without engendering subor-
..
9 MINoW, supra note 5, at 20-21.
TYIsKA, supra note 41 passim.
CENTER FOR UNIVERSAL DESIGN, PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL DESIGN (1999), at
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/.
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dination and further segregation. Ideally, changes should not
emanate from a sense of pity, nor should they reflect the inferi-
ority or dependence of persons with disabilities. Moreover,
"special treatment," as it were, should not be a mandated prac-
tice, but rather an extra opportunity. Ironically, these exam-
ples-the proposals regarding accessibility and law enforcement
training reform-achieve a resolution to the dilemma of differ-
ence in opposite ways. Universal design principles do not create
"special" treatment, but instead work to broaden the sense of
"normal" treatment. In contrast, the training programs involve
"special" attention to the needs of persons with disabilities, the
success of which is dependent upon constantly working to erode
officials' assumptions about persons with disabilities as less ca-
pable and credible participants in the criminal justice process.
Thus, although it reinforces the special character of disabilities,
it would remove the stigma of difference and make difference
"costless."
Hate crime laws, too, create a novel way of orienting the di-
lemma of difference, as it relates to "disabilities," as a policy
provision and "persons with disabilities" as a target population.
As detailed throughout this article, hate crime law is, first and
foremost, about delineating axes of discrimination that demar-
cate groups in need of increased attention and responsiveness
by the criminal justice system. This delineation is legitimated in
light of its differential vulnerabilities to violence. In simple
terms, hate crime law is a recent, innovative, and distinct policy
option available to, arguably, enhance the status and welfare of
persons with disabilities.
Hate crime laws treat persons with disabilities as both "differ-
ent from" and "the same as" other persons. They do so by si-
multaneously segregating and integrating persons with
disabilities from/into the criminal justice system. As we show
below, envisioning crimes against persons with disabilities as a
"hate crime" entails affording "special" treatment to those with
disabilities. At the same time, it requires treating persons with
disabilities the "same" as other minority groups and other indi-
viduals victimized by violence because of membership in a so-
cially recognizable group.
With regard to different treatment and segregated practices,
including "persons with disabilities" in the formulation of "hate
crime" elevates some crimes committed against persons with
disabilities to a unique category of criminal conduct. This
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criminal category-hate crime-evokes unique policing prac-
tices, 14 special prosecutorial concerns,1 43 and harsher penal-
ties.1" When applied to persons with disabilities, hate crime law
bestows minority status upon fifty-four million people who com-
prise the disabled population in the United States. r4  Thus, hate
crime law has the potential to distinguish persons with disabili-
ties from the rest of the population of potential crime victims.
With regard to same treatment and integrating practices,
the institutionalization of disabilities provisions in hate crime
law serves to include persons with disabilities into the coalition
of status groups already covered under the law, ensuring there is
nothing "special" or "different" about persons with disabilities.
That is, "persons with disabilities" are extended the "same"
treatment afforded to other similarly situated groups, in this
case other "target groups" that evidence the presence of a group
identity, historical discrimination, and bias-motivated violence
directed toward them. In addition, all of the target groups in
hate crime law are afforded the same treatment as any other po-
tential crime victim because hate crime laws-like the other
anti-discrimination laws that preceded them-are written in a
way that elides the historical basis and meaning of hate crime.
Hate crime laws elide by translating specific categories of per-
sons-blacks, Jews, gay and lesbians, immigrants, and women,
for example-into all-encompassing and seemingly neutral cate-
gories (e.g., race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin).
In doing so, the laws do not offer any remedies or protections to
these groups that are not simultaneously available to all other
races, religions, genders, sexual orientations, nationalities, etc.'
Indeed, members of "majority groups" can and have used hate
crime law on their behalf.
47
It is important to emphasize, however, that the history and
content of violence organized around axes of (dis)ability are
not equivalent to other forms of discriminatory violence, such as
' Chuck Wexler & Gary T. Marx, When Law and Order Works: Boston's Innovative
Approach to the Problem of Racial Violence, 32 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 205, 205 (1986);
Martin, supra note 32, at 305; Berk et al., supra note 19, at 133; JENNESS & GRATMET,
supra note 12, at 138.
'
4 JENNESS & GRATET, supra note 12, at 147-51.
..4 Id. at 148.
'
4 McNEiL, supra note 37, at 1.
146 SeeJENNEss & GRATrET, supra note 12, at 179.
, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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those organized around race or religion. But, anti-gay/lesbian
violence is not equivalent to racial or religious-based violence ei-
ther; nor is violence organized around gender equivalent to vio-
lence organized around race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. Emerging
within the context of an American legal tradition that embraces
a "sameness" principle, hate crime law does not possess the nu-
ance to treat these different manifestations of intergroup con-
flict differently. Indeed, sameness in the context of hate crime
has meant that laws have been written in a way that equates a
hate crime against a black person with one against a white per-
son, thus promoting "within category" sameness. Similarly, hate
crimes against persons with disabilities are rendered equivalent
to hate crimes against Muslims, thus inscribing "across category"
sameness.
At the end of the day, all target groups are treated the same
and all sides of demonstrable axes of social inequality and the
criminal victimization that informs, maintains, and reflects it are
treated the same. Although hate crime law can, at a glance, ap-
pear to identify, demarcate, and promote attentiveness to social
differences, the way it is written and enforced promotes same-
ness and overrides differences. Thus, it is possible that hate
crime law manages to increase public awareness of criminal vic-
timization of persons with disabilities without defining them as
"special."
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